Time on Camera: An Alternative Explanation of NASCAR Tournaments by Groothuis, Peter & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Groothuis, P.A., Groothuis, J.D., and Rotthoff, K.W. (2011) Time on Camera: An Alternative Explanation of NASCAR 
Tournaments. Journal of Sports Economics, 12(5): 561-570 (Oct 2011). Published by SAGE. 
doi:10.1177/1527002510385910 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time on Camera: An Additional Explanation of 
NASCAR Tournaments 
Peter A. Groothuis, Jana D. Groothuis, and Kurt W. Rotthoff 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing’s (NASCAR) monetary reward 
structure uses a linear payout for races, with a nonlinear payout for the season 
long tournament. The authors suggest that the season long nonlinear payout is 
magnified by taking into consideration the value of sponsorship time on camera 
and sponsor mentions during a race on TV. Given the importance of corporate 
sponsorship in NASCAR, the authors suggest that performance in a race provides 
additional benefits that are not captured in the monetary payout. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Often sporting contests are used as a labor market laboratory to empirically test the 
implications of labor economics such as tournament theory (Kahn, 2000). In sports, 
nonlinear payment structures are found in rank order tournaments such as golf 
(Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Melton & Zorn, 2000) and marathon running (Frick, 
2003). Auto racing provides an exception to the rule with a linear payment schedule 
paid to each race position. It is argued that the use of a nonlinear payment 
tournament structure in auto racing may provide incentives to induce risk-taking and 
cause accidents to occur (von Allmen, 2001). 
 
The influence of a nonlinear compensation mechanism on the level of effort is 
also found in labor markets. Nonlinear payments in rank order tournaments have 
been used to explain everything from corporate CEO’s salaries (Prendergast, 
1998) to increased effort in migrant labor (Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2007). 
Rosen (1988, p. 89) states that ‘‘Much could be gained by studying the details of real 
organizations . . . where many of the forces suggested by theory can be observed and 
new observations that will enrich the theory can be discovered.’’ The National Association 
for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) tournaments has been used by 
researchers for this type of labor market laboratory due to the linear payment structure 
(Schwartz, Isaacs, & Carilli, 2007; von Allmen, 2001). Both von Allmen (2001) 
and Schwartz, Isaacs, and Carilli (2007) suggest that corporate sponsorship plays an 
important role in NASCAR influences the behavior of drivers. 
 
We agree that the individual races pose a linear payout; however, using season 
long data, we find that the value of winning an individual race throughout the season 
reveals a hidden nonlinear payout when aspects of corporate sponsorship are 
included. NASCAR drivers, throughout the season, participate in two tournaments. 
The first is the traditional monetary payout offered both at the track and in the season 
long points race. The second is competition for corporate sponsor exposure time on 
camera during a race broadcast. 
 
 
TOURNAMENTS 
 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) were the first to examine the incentive properties of 
rewards based on relative performance, rather than absolute performance. Many 
benefits are found using this reward structure, such as the mitigation of moral hazard 
and adverse selection (Malcolmson, 1984). Others, however, have found negative 
effects associated with the use of tournament wage structures such as sabotage 
(Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008), collusion between agents (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 
2003), and increased variation in performance (Hood, 2008; Hvide, 2002). 
 
Harbring and Irenbusch (2008) propose that a tournament should induce agents to 
exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. Using experiments, 
they show that sabotage occurs in tournaments. Chen (2003) finds that when relative 
performance is important, sabotage occurs and abler members are subject to more 
attacks. Hvide (2002) suggests that when agents can influence both the mean and the 
variance of an output distribution, incentives are created that reduce effort and 
increase risk-taking behavior. He posits that the incentives explain why the relative 
performance principal is not supported in the literature pertaining to CEO salaries. 
Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009), however, find that tournament incentives are 
positively related to the performance of CEOs. 
 
In golf, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) find that as the reward increases, so does 
performance; a result further supported by Melton and Zorn (2000). Hood (2008) 
shows that the tournament payouts decrease the incentive to be consistent. He finds 
that golfers in the Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) can make more money if 
they are inconsistent throughout the season, as opposed to consistently placing in the 
middle of the field. J. Brown (2008) shows that when a superstar is present, like 
Tiger Woods, then less effort is exerted by other participants. 
 
Tournament theory is also used in foot racing. Both Maloney and McCormick 
(2000) and Lynch and Zax (2000) find that by offering more prize money and 
increasing prize spreads performance rises. Lynch and Zax (2000) find that with 
higher prize money better athletes participate in the race, suggesting that adverse 
selection can be addressed by tournament payouts. In marathon running, Frick 
(2003) finds that prize money and spread increase performance but it also lowers the 
probability of runners finishing the race when it is clear they will not win. He attributes 
the early exit to the amount of time it takes to physically recover from a 
marathon. 
 
Becker and Huselid (1992), drawing on two panels, one from NASCAR and one 
from the International Motor Sport Association (IMSA) show that tournament 
spread has a positive effect on performance and drivers engage in riskier behavior 
as the spread increases. Von Allmen (2001) demonstrates that for individual races 
in NASCAR, the payout structure is relatively flat when compared to other sports 
(for individual races, not the season as a whole). 
 
Von Allmen (2001) develops three hypotheses as to why NASCAR has a linear 
payout per race and nonlinear payout for overall season results: the sabotage risk of 
accident hypothesis, the cost of racing hypothesis, and the sponsorship hypothesis. 
NASCAR drivers have the ability to influence not only their position but other competitors’ 
positions on the track. The sabotage risk of accident hypothesis posits that 
nonlinear rewards might cause drivers to take risks and wreck their opponents to 
move up through the field. Ronfeldt (1999) suggests that drivers themselves coordinate 
safe driving equilibriums using a tit for tat strategy throughout the season. Any 
one driver does not want to have a reputation for being reckless because the other 
drivers will react to that in future races. The cost hypothesis proposes that fielding 
a racing team is very expensive. High rewards for lower placing teams are observed 
in NASCAR because it is important for entrants to continue to pay for their equipment. 
The sponsorship hypothesis supposes that a corporate sponsor’s desire for 
exposure provides incentives for NASCAR to encourage consistence through a 
season. 
 
Empirical tests on von Allmen’s hypotheses have shown mixed results. 
Depken and Wilson (2004) find support of the sabotage hypothesis since there is less 
than a one-to-one relationship between concentration of performance and concentration 
of rewards. They also find ‘‘that performance-points concentration do not 
Granger-cause winnings concentration,’’ which is inconsistent with the cost hypothesis. 
In addition, Schwartz, Isaacs, and Carilli (2007) show that less skilled drivers 
are more aggressive and have more accidents than skilled drivers. They argue that 
higher skilled drivers are more concerned with the season long tournament than less 
skilled drivers. 
 
We further test von Allmens’ hypotheses and suggest that sponsorship structures 
create a tournament for exposure time on camera and sponsorship mentions 
during a televised race. We hypothesize that NASCAR teams in competition for 
sponsorship want to provide the maximum exposure time for the current sponsors 
so they can get more sponsorship dollars in future contracts. If tournament style 
payouts exist within corporate sponsorship then the drivers will have many of the 
same incentives to win as with the traditional nonlinear tournament payment structure 
in other sports. 
 
 
CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP 
 
Corporate Sponsorship is an important form of funding in automotive sports and has 
a long history in NASCAR. Corporate sponsorship of the NASCAR series began in 
1971 with R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Legislation had just been enacted 
where tobacco companies could not advertise on television, so R. J. Reynolds used 
sponsorship as a way to get their brand name out in front of consumers. ‘‘The company 
helped many tracks clean and improve their facilities and sent some of its 
best marketing executives to help local track owners better promote their races’’ 
(Hagstrom, 1998, The NASCAR Way, p. 79). 
 
Corporate sponsorship grew as television exposure increased. Many point to the 
1979 Daytona 500 as when NASCAR became a national sport. It was the first 
500-mile race in history to be telecast live in its entirety. It was also the first 
NASCAR race that many people saw on television due to an east coast snowstorm. 
The end of the race was especially exciting when Cale Yarborough and Donnie 
Allison were televised swinging helmets and fists after wrecking each other in turn 
three. People sat up and took notice of NASCAR, so corporations took notice too. By 
the middle of the 1980s, many Fortune 500 companies were involved in sponsoring 
NASCAR, individual races teams, as well as race tracks.1 Pruitt, Cornwell, and 
Clark (2004) using an event study show a positive link between the corporate 
sponsorship in NASCAR and shareholder wealth. 
 
NASCAR corporate sponsorship is usually brokered through companies such as 
Just Marketing Incorporated. A company interested in sponsoring a race team would 
assign a marketing budget and Just Marketing Incorporated would help them choose 
a team and driver to get the best exposure for their product or company. The budgets 
usually assigned to sponsor a team would be from $56 to $60 million for F1, 
$20 million for a NASCAR Sprint Cup, and $7 million for the Indy Racing League 
(Z. Brown, 2008). 
The disparity between racing leagues is due to potential exposure. F1 has international 
exposure somewhat like a yearly Olympic contest. They race in 17 countries 
for more than 9 months, with a total of 17 races. NASCAR Sprint Cup and Indy 
Racing have a domestic U.S. market. NASCAR has 36 races for more than 
10 months, while Indy Racing is much smaller with only 17 races. In terms of 
television viewership, NASCAR is ranked second in the United States behind the 
National Football League in sport broadcasts (Chang, 2007; Cazeneuve et al., 
2004). Although baseball is commonly referred to as ‘‘America’s Pastime,’’ a recent 
Nielson rating of the World Series, Super Bowl, and Daytona 500, over the past 
34 years (1974-20072) shows that viewership of baseball’s World Series has 
declined since 1980, whereas viewership for the Daytona 500 and Super Bowl have 
increased (Gorman, 2009a, 2009b). 
 
We define two measures of benefits to drivers from TV exposure. The first is 
monetary value of sponsor time on TV (VALUE SPONSOR TIME) per season and 
the number of sponsor mentions (SPONSOR MENTIONS) during racing broadcasts 
per season. Both were obtained from the Joyce Julius research firm.3 The variable 
VALUE SPONSOR TIME is measured by the Joyce Julius research staff as: 
 
All clear and in-focus exposure time a brand receives during the broadcast. In order for 
the brand’s logo to be considered clear and in-focus, the image must not be blurred or 
obstructed in a way as to prevent the typical viewer from acknowledging the brand. 
Along with the visual exposure, Joyce Julius also monitors each verbal mention 
received by the brand throughout the telecast. Mentions are valued at ten seconds each, 
based on an average of 3 brand mentions per 30-second commercial. Once all of the 
visual and/or verbal exposure has been tabulated, a value for the brand’s exposure is 
calculated by comparing the on-screen time and mentions to the non-discounted cost 
of a commercial, which ran during the specific program in question. (Joyce Julius & 
Associates) 
 
This measure is calculated for each sponsor during a race then summed for the season 
and matched to the driver whose primary sponsor is the brand measured. 
 
In Table 1, we report the overall means of the variables in our panel of NASCAR 
drivers matched with their corporate sponsor for years 2000 to 2007. A primary 
sponsor is the sponsor that appears on the hood of the car and on the team uniforms. 
We include only those drivers who have one primary sponsor for the season.4 
 
 
 
 
The mean cash winning is $4 million per season, where the mean VALUE SPONSOR 
TIME is $39.6 million for the season. The SPONSOR MENTIONS per season 
is the number of each verbal mention received by the brand throughout the telecast 
then summed for the season and matched to the primary sponsor driver. The mean 
SPONSOR MENTIONS per season is 78. 
 
In addition to the sponsor data, we include season-variant and performance data 
for each season. Our season-variant data include age and tenure of the driver. Our 
performance data include the number of wins, second through fifth place finishes, 
sixth through tenth place finishes, and final season rank. The average driver’s per 
season wins is 0.97, second through fifth place finishes per season is 4.49, and 
sixth through tenth place finishes per season is 4.49. The average rank in the 
standings is 20.9. The average age of a driver is 37 years and has tenure in racing 
of 11 years. It is important to note that these measures, VALUE SPONSOR TIME 
and SPONSOR MENTIONS, are during the race. These mentions are during races 
but not necessarily the race in which the win occurs. It is possible that a winning race 
could lead to more sponsor mentions in subsequent races. This is not a measure of 
sponsorship dollars received for a driver, or team, outside the race itself. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To test if competition for TV time serves as a tournament for NASCAR drivers, we 
estimate a fixed effects model for both VALUE SPONSOR TIME per season and 
SPONSOR MENTIONS per season. The fixed effect model controls for driverspecific 
characteristics that might influence time on camera such as celebrity or family 
status. For instance, many drivers have family connections in racing such as Petty 
or Earnhardt, which might provide a brand name loyalty in fans influencing their 
time on camera that is unrelated to performance (Groothuis & Groothuis, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 2, we report the results of the fixed effects model5 for season cash winnings, 
VALUE SPONSOR TIME, and SPONSOR MENTIONS. The cash payout for winning 
a race during the season is worth $328,000, whereas the results on VALUE 
SPONSOR TIME show that each win translates into $3.2 million of additional 
TV sponsorship exposure time per season, while each second through fifth finish 
increases TV sponsor time by $2.5 million per season. The sponsorship value is 
roughly ten times as large for winning the race and thirty times as large for placing 
second through fifth finish then the monetary payment. The value of placing sixth 
through tenth is statistically insignificant, showing that the tournament for VALUE 
SPONSOR TIME takes place for the top five finishers in the race. In addition, rank is 
negative and statistically significant in the cash payout regression but statistically 
insignificant in the VALUE SPONSOR TIME model further suggesting that the 
tournament for TV time exists only for the top finishers of a race. These results support 
that time on camera serves as a nonlinear payout for the five top finishers in a 
NASCAR race. 
 
In Table 2, we report the results of a fixed effect model on SPONSOR MENTION 
per season. We find that a win leads to 16 more sponsorship mentions per season; 
however, the coefficients on second through fifths and sixth through tenths are both 
statistically insignificant. The result of the SPONSOR MENTIONS specification 
supports the hypothesis that drivers compete for corporate sponsorship mentions 
as part of the tournament reward structure to racing and when it comes to the number 
of mentions winning is most important. These results magnify the results found in 
von Allmen (2001), finding that a season long tournament in NASCAR does exist. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that when including corporate sponsorships into the 
tournament reward structure, the per-race payout is larger than previously thought. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We show that NASCAR’s reward system for rank order tournaments is more 
nonlinear when the value of TV sponsorship time and sponsorship mentions is 
included. We find that NASCAR drivers participate in two tournaments. The first is 
the traditional monetary payout offered at the track where each win pays $328,000. 
The second is time on camera during a race broadcast that provides 3.2 million dollars 
of TV exposure for each win in the season. This is nearly ten times the value of 
the monetary payment. We also find that winning a race translates into 16 more 
sponsor mentions per season. This can occur because winning one race can lead 
to discussions about that winning driver at other races throughout the season. Our 
empirical results show that the tournament for TV time only takes place for the top 
five finishers in a race. 
 
Our analysis suggests that it is not necessary for NASCAR to provide a nonlinear 
payment mechanism because the external tournament for TV exposure provides the 
benefits for the winners of a race. Given the importance of corporate sponsorship in 
NASCAR, we suggest that winning a race provides additional benefits that are not 
captured in the race payout, continuing to find a traditional nonlinear tournament 
payment schedule throughout the season. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. This information come from NASCAR.com. 
2. Except for the 1994 baseball strike year. 
3. Joyce Julius & Associates, Inc., founded in 1985 measures sponsorship impact in media. 
The website for this company is http://www.joycejulius.com/index.html. 
4. Some drivers either shared a sponsor or had multiple sponsors over the season. These 
drivers 
were excluded from our analysis to focus on teams that were primarily funded by one 
source. The majority of teams from 2000 to 2007 had only one primary sponsor. 
5. The Hausman test is included in Table 2. 
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